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Abstract 
 
Employees exposed to high involvement management (HIM) practices have higher subjective 
wellbeing, fewer accidents but more short absence spells than “like” employees not exposed to HIM. 
These results are robust to extensive work, wage and sickness absence history controls. We highlight 
the possibility of higher short-term absence in the presence of HIM because it is more demanding than 
standard production and because multi-skilled HIM workers cover for one another’s short absences 
thus reducing the cost of replacement labour faced by the employer. We find direct empirical support 
for this. In accordance with the theoretical framework we find also that long-term absences are 
independent of exposure to HIM, which is consistent with long-term absences entailing replacement 
labour costs and with short absences having a negative effect on longer absences. 
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1. Introduction 
 
What people do affects how they feel at the time and how they subsequently evaluate themselves and 
their life more generally (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). What happens at work matters partly because 
working individuals spend so much of their time at work, but also because it is salient in the way they 
think about themselves and the value they attach to their lives. This is borne out in empirical research. 
For instance, studies focusing on reflexive wellbeing indicate that job satisfaction is strongly positively 
associated with life satisfaction, even after controlling for satisfaction with other aspects of one’s life 
(Rice et al., 1980). Job satisfaction is also strongly associated with better mental health measured in a 
variety of ways (Warr, 2007; Llena-Nozal, 2009). However, recent research paints a more nuanced 
picture. Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) studies show that time spent with one’s supervisor is 
often among the most stressful and least enjoyable parts of the day (Kahneman et al., 2004). So paid 
employment can be both good and bad for wellbeing. The type of work one undertakes also appears to 
be important. Thus, although moving into employment from non-employment is usually associated 
with improvements in mental health, the gains to entering non-standard employment contracts are 
often much lower (Llena-Nozal, 2009). 
 
Standard models assume that employers make adjustments to the production process to maximise 
profits, rather than employee wellbeing. Consistent with this, there is empirical evidence that 
management practices will be adopted if their productivity benefits exceed the costs of introducing and 
maintaining them (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) and that firms will switch management practices - 
even if they are productivity enhancing - if the costs outweigh the benefits (Freeman and Kleiner, 
2005). However, the way jobs are designed can also have a profound impact on workers’ mental and 
physical wellbeing (Wood, 2008; Pouliakas and Theodoropoulos, 2012a). There is also evidence that 
happier workers are more productive at work (Oswald et al., 2009; Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2012). 
It does not follow, however, that employers will invest to maximise the wellbeing of their workers since 
such investments are themselves costly. 
 
In recent decades many employers have introduced practices designed to maximise employees’ sense of 
involvement with their work, and their commitment to the wider organisation, in the expectation that 
this will improve their organisation’s performance. Although there is a good deal of debate as to the 
precise set of practices that are deemed “high involvement practices”, core components include teams, 
problem-solving groups, information sharing, incentive pay, and supportive practices such as training 
and associated recruitment methods (Wood and Bryson, 2009). Collectively they constitute “high 
involvement management” (HIM). Rarely do analysts believe single practices constitute the presence of 
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HIM. Rather, it is “bundles” of practices - often incorporating greater autonomy or control and greater 
performance-based pay - which analysts believe can help transform the working environment 
(Ichniowski et al., 1997; Ichniowski and Shaw, 2009; Shaw, 2009). A sizeable literature explores the 
links between these practices and firm performance (for a review see Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011), 
but far less is known about the effects of HIM on employees’ health and other measures of wellbeing. 
The investigation of links between HIM and worker wellbeing is timely because HIM has become 
increasingly common in developed industrialised economies (Wood and Bryson, 2009) while, at the 
same time and perhaps coincidentally, there are indications of a decline in worker wellbeing (Oswald, 
2010; Green, 2006, 2009). A priori, it is uncertain what impact HIM is likely to have on employee 
wellbeing. On the one hand, if HIM enriches employees’ working lives by offering them greater job 
autonomy, more mental stimulation, team-based social interaction, and a heightened sense of 
achievement, this may improve worker wellbeing. On the other hand, if HIM is simply a means of 
intensifying worker effort, this may lead to a higher incidence of illness, injury, absence and stress.  
 
In this paper, we explore the impact of HIM practices on worker wellbeing using an innovative 
combination of survey and register data. The use of linked data provides us methodological advance 
over the existing studies. The key problem in previous research is that workers are not randomly 
assigned into HIM. This may bias the estimates of HIM on employee wellbeing considerably. If 
workers with ‘good’ work histories are more likely to be found in HIM jobs, the estimates of HIM on 
employee wellbeing are upwardly biased.1 The size of this bias is not known. We tackle the problem 
caused by sorting of employees into HIM status by controlling for a particularly rich set of employees’ 
work and sickness absence histories. This provides us better identification strategy than the ones that 
have been used previously.  
 
Using linked data we contribute to the literature in five ways. First, we establish whether healthier 
workers sort into jobs that involve using high involvement practices, as one might expect if HIM jobs 
demand more of workers than non-HIM jobs. We do so by linking register data on Finnish workers’ 
absence histories to a nationally representative survey in which employees identify which, if any, high 
involvement practices they are exposed to in their jobs. Second, we estimate the impact of HIM 
practices on employee wellbeing having controlled for worker sorting into HIM jobs by conditioning 
on sickness absence histories and work and wage histories. Data limitations mean this has not been 
possible in the literature until now. Third, we present theoretical arguments on why higher short-term 
                                                 
1 We use the adjective “good” to refer to work histories exhibiting high and/or rising wages and stable employment with 
few unemployment and sickness absence spells. 
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absences in the presence of HIM are consistent with no association between HIM and long-term 
absences. Fourth, unlike most of the literature that tends to focus on specific aspects of worker 
wellbeing we explore HIM effects across a broad range of wellbeing measures. Specifically, we estimate 
the effects of HIM on three types of wellbeing measure, namely sickness absences, both short-term and 
long-term; subjective wellbeing (job satisfaction, work capacity, the state of one’s health, and feelings of 
tiredness); and physical discomfort at work, as measured by the experience of pain in four different 
parts of the body (lumber, legs, arms and neck). Finally, we estimate the empirical models for a 
complete set of different “bundles” of HIM practices. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section Two reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literatures linking HIM to employees’ wellbeing. Section Three introduces the data. Section Four 
reports our results and Section Five concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical and empirical literatures 
 
Since the early 1980s management theorists and practitioners have advocated innovations in job design 
expressly intended to elicit greater labour productivity via greater employee involvement (Beer et al., 
1984, 1985; Walton, 1985). Scholars in the Harvard Business School tradition identify human resources 
as a key asset in value production and maintain that firms can gain a hard-to-replicate competitive 
advantage over rivals through investment in management practices which devolve responsibilities to 
employees in the organization of work (Walton, 1987; Pfeffer, 1998). The shift towards job autonomy 
is often perceived as a move away from the deskilling imperatives associated with Taylorist principles of 
hierarchical work organization towards job enrichment and “high commitment”. In return, employers 
might expect improved labour productivity through increased worker effort or through “smarter” 
working arising from employees’ increased opportunities to utilize tacit knowledge about efficient 
working which would not have been sought in a more hierarchically structured organization. 
 
2.1. Theory 
 
One might assume that if HIM entails job enrichment it might improve worker wellbeing by increasing 
worker control over job tasks, increasing mental stimulation, providing greater opportunities for social 
interaction via team-working, and via a greater sense of achievement at work. However, demanding 
more of workers through the introduction of high involvement management practices may also have 
negative effects on employees’ subjective wellbeing. According to Karasek (1979) workers’ mental and 
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emotional wellbeing is negatively related to job demands and positively related to job control. Increases 
in both are implied by a shift to HIM.   
 
Even if HIM enhances job control, the process of HIM introduction can generate uncertainty leading to 
increased anxiety among workers, in much the same way as other processes of change. These effects on 
employee subjective wellbeing are unlikely to persist since those worst affected will choose to leave the 
organisation while the remainder are liable to adapt over time (Kahneman et al., 1999). Whether HIM 
innovations will lead to deterioration in employee wellbeing depends, in part, on what Payne (1979) and 
Karasek and Theorell (1990) term “social supports”. These supports, which might include union 
representation and consultative management, have the capacity to buffer individuals against the worst 
effects of workplace innovation. 
 
High involvement management may also affect employee physical wellbeing either positively or 
negatively for a number of reasons. Since changes in physical health often accompany changes in 
mental and emotional wellbeing, HIM effects on subjective wellbeing may feed through to changes in 
physical wellbeing. Where workers have job autonomy they can instigate innovations in work practices 
which can reduce workers’ exposure to risks of injury and disease. Management can use the review of 
job tasks and work organization accompanying the introduction of HIM to “build in” better working 
conditions for workers resulting in improved physical wellbeing, irrespective of the degree of job 
autonomy those HIM practices offer workers. Also the training that is integral to so many HIM 
innovations can raise worker competence thus reducing risks of accidents and injury. On the other 
hand, if HIM is used as a form of labour intensification it may lead to an increased risk of accidents, 
job-related pain or injury. 
 
HIM effects on employees’ subjective and physical wellbeing may also affect their absence rates. HIM-
induced increases (or reductions) in injury and illness should have a direct bearing on the amount of 
sickness absence employees take relative to what they would have taken in the absence of HIM. There 
are other less clear-cut scenarios in which whether a worker chooses to be absent from work is a 
marginal cost-benefit decision (Allen, 1981; Treble and Barmby, 2011). This choice will turn, in part, on 
whether HIM is viewed by the employee as an amenity or disamenity. If it is viewed as a disamenity 
which is not compensated with increased financial rewards - either through base pay or incentive pay - 
HIM may increase absence taking. However, certain HIM practices can be expected to reduce 
absenteeism. In the case of incentive pay, loss aversion will encourage workers to attend because absent 
workers forgo incentive payments (Merriman and Deckop, 2007). Where worker inputs are 
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complementary, as in the case of team-working, workers may come under co-worker pressures to 
minimise absence, particularly if performance is judged on team outputs (Drago and Wooden, 1992; 
Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Knez and Simester, 2001; Heywood and Jirjahn, 2004).  
 
HIM may also affect absences through its impact on the firms’ optimizing behaviour. One can think of 
firms choosing an optimal rate of absence. Increasing worker wellbeing is likely to benefit firms, but at 
a decreasing rate. On the other hand, the marginal cost of decreasing absenteeism can be increasing. 
Equality of marginal benefits and costs determines the absence rate that is optimal from the point of 
view of the firm. Since firms differ in terms of production processes, the optimal rate varies across 
firms. In particular, HIM practices may have a bearing on the optimal absence rate. What Coles et al. 
(2007) and Coles and Treble (1996) term the “shadow price of absenteeism” may differ in HIM firms 
and non-HIM firms. In the sort of multitasking environment which predominates in many HIM firms, 
workers can substitute for one another in the short term without the firm having to bring in additional 
labour. Therefore, it may be worthwhile paying the additional short run cost of absences if it means 
that the firm can meet production schedules. Additional tiredness associated with the intensity of HIM 
production may require short absences to recuperate in order to avoid longer term absences. These 
arguments suggest likely differences in the impacts of HIM on the length of absences, with HIM 
employees taking more short absences.  
 
Coles and Treble (1993, 1996) have formed models to explain firms’ demand for absences. In their 
models this rises from the fact that workers may have true sickness absences but may also be absent for 
personal reasons. Worker absences cause disruptions in the production process when there is an 
assembly line technology where workers are complementary and at least a minimum number of 
workers are required to be present to obtain positive output. Therefore, the firms will use wage policies 
that reduce absences. However, the Coles and Treble model does not fully fit our purposes. First, the 
institutional setting in our empirical application is such that the workers get full pay for a relatively long 
time during sickness absences (see Appendix 1). Thus, there is little room for absence-reducing wage 
policies and we can assume that the same wage is paid whether the worker is at work or absent. 
Secondly, we want to emphasize such work organization where absences can partly be covered by co-
workers and therefore absences do not cause zero production. Rather, we assume a more standard 
technology where absences lead to a proportional drop in the labour input and the effective labour 
input has decreasing returns. Therefore, a firm with absences would have lower marginal productivity 
than a firm without absences. Thirdly, we want to make a distinction between short-term absences, 
which are easier to cover by the other employees and long-term absences, which are more difficult to 
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cover and which may lead to a need for replacement hiring and are therefore more costly to the firm. 
We interpret long-term absences as work accidents. 
 
The impact of the HIM practices can be described with their relationship to absence probability and 
production loss.2 The purpose of the practices is to increase productivity. However, high work intensity 
can also increase the probability of short absences pS. With multi-tasking team work it may be easier for 
the other team members to replace the absent workers in the short run, so the production loss from 
absences αS (0 ≤ αS ≤ 1) would be lower than without team work. The expected share of lost 
production is pSαS. The firm could them optimize work intensity (and thereby the absence rate): the 
marginal benefit is the increased production through higher work intensity and the marginal cost is the 
expected production loss through absences. Correspondingly, the marginal benefit or worker welfare 
(lower absences) is the reduced production loss and the marginal cost of welfare is the lower 
production with less intensive work. 
 
The short absences may also be a mechanism for reducing accidents. The probability of accidents is pA, 
the corresponding proportional production loss is αA (0 ≤ αA ≤ 1), and the expected share of lost 
production is pAαA. Since long-term absences are more difficult to cover by the other workers even 
with team work, αA is likely to be higher than the loss from short absences as the firm may have to hire 
new workers with less firm-specific skills. It is therefore optimal for HIM and non-HIM firms alike to 
avoid long-term absences. Although higher work intensity in HIM work may have a direct accident-
increasing effect, it is counteracted if the workers can use short absences to recuperate. The accident 
probability can then be treated as a function pA = pA(pS), with dpA/dpS < 0. This would decrease the 
marginal cost of work intensity, leading to higher work intensity and therefore a higher short-term 
absence rate in HIM work than in non-HIM work, but not necessarily a higher rate of long-term 
absences. 
 
2.2. Evidence 
 
The evidence on the link between subjective wellbeing and job control and job demands tends to 
support Karasek’s theory. Using linked employer-employee data for Britain Wood (2008) confirms that 
worker wellbeing is negatively related to job demands and positively related to job control, and that 
high job controls reduce the negative association between job demands and wellbeing. Studies which 
examine the effects of specific HIM practices indicate that they are often associated with high levels of 
                                                 
2 The theoretical model is fully presented in the working paper version. 
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work intensity and worker stress (Barker, 1993; Godard, 2001), even when they are also associated with 
higher work commitment (Ramsay et al., 2000) or higher job control (Gallie, 2005).3 
 
The process of innovating can also generate anxiety. In a case study Bordia et al. (2004) link 
organizational change to psychological stress through perceived loss of control. Pollard (2001) shows 
that workplace reorganization caused significant increases in distress and in systolic blood pressure and 
that uncertainty was a key factor. However, as predicted by theory, social supports can help workers 
cope with workplace innovation. Using the same linked employer-employee survey as Wood (2008), 
Bryson et al. (2012) find supportive evidence for the buffering effect of unionisation in ameliorating the 
negative impacts of workplace innovation on job anxiety.  
 
Using data for the late 1990s Green (2006) shows that task discretion has been declining in most 
European countries. Green and Tsitsianis (2005) show that in Britain there has also been a decline in 
job satisfaction which is accounted for by declining task discretion and the intensification of work 
effort. Rather than being a force for job enrichment, it appears that HIM was introduced over the 
period as part of a lean production system geared to cost reductions and just-in-time production. There 
is direct evidence that this is the case in Britain (Wood and Bryson, 2009). Just-in-time production is 
associated with poorer sick pay provision (Lanfranchi and Treble, 2010), as predicted under Coles and 
Treble’s (1996) model. Taken together, findings from these studies suggest HIM may well be associated 
with injuries, accidents and higher levels of absenteeism. However, other British studies suggest HIM 
increases satisfaction at work. Green and Heywood (2008) document that performance pay increases 
job satisfaction while Jones et al. (2009) report that satisfaction with employer-provided training 
reduces absenteeism. Also, Pouliakas and Theodoropoulos (2012b) find that the British private sector 
establishments that link their pay with individual performance have significantly lower absence rates.  
 
The evidence for continental Europe is also ambiguous. Askenazy and Caroli (2010) report that in 
France innovative workplace practices are positively associated with mental strain and with worker 
perceptions of occupational risks, but not with occupational injury. Heywood and Jirjahn (2004) find 
absence rates are lower in German manufacturing in the presence of team-working. However, Frick 
and Simmons’s (2010) case study of a large German steel plant supports the contention that HIM 
increases accidents and absenteeism via labour intensification. In their study the introduction of 
production bonuses for teams leads to an increase in both absence rates and the number and severity of 
                                                 
3 In his review of the literature Godard (2004) suggests the evidence is more mixed. For instance, there are some studies 
such as Appelbaum et al. (2000), who find no adverse effects.  
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accidents. The steel workers face a capped incentive structure allowing them to achieve their maximum 
bonus without fully utilising labour, thus enabling them to share out leisure time in the form of 
coordinated absences. Furthermore, incentive payments in the absence of teams result in an increased 
accident rate which they suggest is evidence of “excessive incentivization ... workers work too hard and 
cause accidents through carelessness and/or fatigue” (2010, p. 14). In the presence of teams, incentive 
pay is not associated with increased accidents, a finding the authors say is consistent with team 
members taking care of one another to ensure they make the team bonus. Finally, Bender et al. (2012) 
relate piece rates to increased workplace injuries with European data.  
 
Empirical evidence for North America is equally ambiguous (Handel and Levine, 2004). Establishment-
level studies for the United States have identified a positive link between managerial innovations and 
workplace injuries (Askenazy, 2001; Fairris and Brenner, 2001) and cumulative trauma disorders 
(Brenner et al., 2004).4 On the other hand, using linked employer-employee data for Canada, Mohr and 
Zoghi (2008) find a robust positive association between HIM and job satisfaction and no association 
with work-related stress. Using the longitudinal component in their data they find higher job 
satisfaction predicts increased participation in HIM whereas participation does not predict future 
satisfaction, a result which raises questions about a causal linkage between HIM and improved worker 
wellbeing. Furthermore, using similar survey instruments in Canada and England in 1998 and 2003/4, 
Godard (2010) reports different relationships between workplace practices and worker subjective 
wellbeing over time and place, leading him to suggest that the associations “may be historically and 
institutionally contingent and thus should be interpreted using a historical ⁄ institutional perspective” 
(2010, p. 466).  
 
Our study utilises nationally representative data from Finland, a country with very high rates of 
unionisation (~70%) and a Scandinavian social model which places a much greater emphasis on social 
dialogue in the workplace than the European and North American countries which account for most of 
the empirical studies. One might expect Finnish employees to have a greater say in the process of 
workplace innovation, offering them opportunities to influence the nature of HIM and the way it is 
introduced and implemented in a manner which may be less common in other settings. In fact, Green 
(2006, p. 103) notes that, whilst job discretion has been on the decline in many countries, it has been 
rising in Finland. The Finnish Quality of Working Life Surveys (QWLS) provide consistent data over 
time to map changes in work organisation in Finland, and they paint a more nuanced picture. For 
instance, while employees’ ability to influence the way their own work is organised has increased in 
                                                 
4 Batt (2004) argues that the effects on wellbeing may also differ by the worker groups. 
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most dimensions, perceptions of work intensity have also increased (Lehto and Sutela, 2009). 
Furthermore, Finland has the highest sickness absence rate in the European Union (Gimeno et al., 
2004). Finland is thus of particular interest when analysing the effects of work practices on worker 
wellbeing. 
 
Using the QWLS 2003 - the same survey we use in this paper - Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008) find HIM 
is negatively correlated with worker stress and positively correlated with both job satisfaction and job 
security. These associations strengthen with the number of HIM practices to which the employee is 
exposed. Böckerman et al. (2012) examine the relationship between HIM and sickness absence and 
accidents using the QWLS 2008. Their results are not so clear cut. Using single equation models, they 
find that innovative work practices increase short-term sickness absence for blue-collar and lower 
white-collar employees. In contrast, in two-equation models that treat innovative workplace practices as 
endogenous variables and control for unobserved correlations between HIM and the wellbeing 
outcomes they do not find significant relationships between innovative work practices and sickness 
absence or accidents at work. However, Böckerman et al. (2012) neither condition on absence and 
work histories, nor do they consider the effects of different “bundles” of HIM. 
 
2.3. Sorting of employees 
 
The difficulty in interpreting the results from the studies reviewed above is establishing whether the 
relationship between HIM and wellbeing outcomes is causal. If HIM jobs are more demanding than 
other jobs, it is plausible that only healthier employees, or those who are mentally and physically more 
resilient, will put themselves forward for HIM jobs, or be offered them by HIM employers. Failure to 
account for selection of healthier workers into HIM jobs will upwardly bias any estimated effect of 
HIM on worker wellbeing since the wellbeing of HIM workers would have been higher than their non-
HIM counterparts even in the absence of HIM. Market frictions mean workers cannot simply choose 
to shift easily between the HIM and non-HIM sectors so that the sector they work in will not 
necessarily reflect preferences but it remains a source of potential estimation bias. We address this 
concern by conditioning on employees’ prior sickness absence. To our knowledge, the only other 
author to do this is Llena-Nozal (2009) in her study of the effect of labour market transitions on mental 
health. She finds that failure to account for previous health histories leads to an upward bias in the 
mental health returns to entering employment. 
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A further threat to causal interpretation of the link between HIM and employee wellbeing arises from 
the fact that HIM and non-HIM workers may differ in dimensions other than their health histories 
which are unobservable to the analyst but which may nevertheless influence their propensity to take 
HIM jobs and their current state of wellbeing. For example, we do not observe risk preferences, yet 
those with high risk preferences may be more prepared to take the demanding and responsible work in 
an HIM job and be more prepared to engage in risky behaviour which adversely affects health. If so, 
this would induce a negative bias in the effects of HIM on employees’ wellbeing. To help overcome 
this problem we also condition on employees’ work and earnings histories which are plausibly highly 
correlated with unobserved worker traits, thus reducing the potential for omitted variables bias. 
 
Omitted variables bias may also arise due to unobserved differences between HIM and non-HIM jobs. 
For instance, HIM jobs may simply be ‘better’ jobs than non-HIM jobs in terms of pay or working 
conditions, in which case they may generate higher worker wellbeing for reasons that are not strictly 
due to the amount of employee involvement they entail. For this reason, we test the sensitivity of our 
results to a full set of job controls including a range of highly detailed job disamenities. 
  
3. Data 
 
Our data are the Quality of Working Life Survey (QWLS) 2003 of Statistics Finland (SF). The initial 
sample for QWLS is derived from a monthly Labour Force Survey (LFS), where a random sample of 
the working age population is selected for a telephone interview. The 2003 QWLS was based on LFS 
respondents in October and November who were 15-64-year-old wage and salary earners with a normal 
weekly working time of at least five hours. 5,270 LFS participants satisfied these conditions and were 
invited to participate in a personal face-to-face interview for the QWLS. Eventually 4,104 persons 
participated (Lehto and Sutela, 2005) in the interviews (a 77.9 percent response rate), which took place 
mostly in October-December 2003, with some taking place in the beginning of January 2004.5 Owing 
                                                 
5 The response rate of QWLS is not low compared to other surveys. For example, the response rate of 77.9% compares 
favourably to virtually any UK based survey. There has been a general trend that the response rates of the surveys are falling 
in Finland and elsewhere for various reasons. QWLS (2003) has still a very high response rate for a complex and 
burdensome face-to-face survey. Lehto and Sutela (2005) provide a detailed analysis of response v. non-response. Their 
overall assessment is that non-response does not seriously undermine the representativeness of the QWLS data. We have 
also learned from personal communication with Anna-Maija Lehto (Statistics Finland) that researchers at Statistics Finland 
have made experiments by calibrating weights to the QWLS to account for non-response in the survey. The use of weights 
to account for non-response proved to have only a minor effect. This supports the argument that non-response does not 
seriously undermine the representativeness of the data. 
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to missing information on some variables for some workers, the sample size used in this study is 3,755 
observations.  
 
In addition to the HIM practices the worker is exposed to in her employment, the QWLS contains 
information on the type of job the employee does and the nature of the employer, together with 
employees’ personal characteristics and work experience. SF supplements QWLS with information 
from the LFS on, for example, working time and exact labour market status, and information on annual 
earnings from tax registers and on education (level and field) from the register of completed degrees. 
Supplementary information on the industry and location of the employer is gathered from various 
other registers maintained by SF.  
 
The QWLS is a cross-section data set that includes only limited self-reported information on past 
labour market experience. However, we match the QWLS data to comprehensive longitudinal register 
data. These are the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data (FLEED). FLEED is constructed 
from a number of different registers on individuals and firms that are maintained by Statistics Finland. 
In particular, FLEED contains information from Employment Statistics, which records each 
employee’s employer during the last week of each year. We match QWLS and FLEED using unique 
personal identifiers (i.e. ID codes for persons). We can follow the employees backwards over the 
period 1990-2003. In each year, we can link information on the firm and establishment to each person. 
 
The dependent variables describe different aspects of worker wellbeing. First we consider sickness 
absence. The QWLS survey has information on the number and length of absences during the last 12 
months. The questions relating to absences are the following: “How many times have you been absent 
1 to 3 days?”; “How many times have you been absent 4 to 9 days?”; “How many times have you been 
absent at least 10 days?”; and regarding the longest absences, “How long were you absent from work? 
(Add up several absences of over 10 days.)”. With this information we can form variables for the total 
number of absence spells. In addition, we can approximate the total days of absences by using 2 days as 
the length of the short 1-3 day absences, 6.5 as the length of the 4-9 day absences, and the actual 
number of days for the long absences.6 An alternative measure is based on information from the Social 
Insurance Institution (KELA). This is the number of days for which the worker has obtained sickness 
allowance from the sickness insurance system. (The details of the Finnish sickness insurance system are 
                                                 
6 Although the question in the survey refers to days of absence from work, it is not clear whether the respondents think of 
these days as actual working days, e.g. Monday to Friday, ‘official’ working days which also include Saturdays but not 
Sundays or holidays, or as calendar days which may include the whole weekends. 
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described in Appendix 1.) Since there is a waiting period of 10 days until eligibility to the sickness 
allowance, this measure only includes long absences. On the other hand, the information on the 
allowance days is available for the whole period 1995-2006, so we can use it both as a control variable 
for past absence history and as an outcome variable.7 The likelihood of systematic reporting error is 
minor, because the KELA data are based on comprehensive registers. Related to the absence variables 
is an indicator for accidents. QWLS has a question on whether the person has had an accident at work 
that has resulted in absence from work in the last 12 months. 
 
The other wellbeing variables are from the QWLS. The second set captures subjective measures of 
employee wellbeing. There is a question on job satisfaction measured on a four-point Likert scale from 
“Very dissatisfied” (coded 1) to “Very satisfied” (coded 4). There is also a question on working 
capacity: “Assuming that your top working capacity would score 10 points while your total inability to 
work would score zero, how many points would you give to your working capacity at the moment?”. 
The state of self-assessed health is measured in the survey with answers on a 5-point scale from “Poor” 
(coded 1) to “Good” (coded 5). We also have a measure of tiredness from answers to the question: 
“How often do you feel reluctant or mentally tired on leaving for work?”. The answers range on a 6-
point scale from “Daily or almost daily” (coded as 1) to “Never” (coded as 6). 
 
The third set of dependent variables capture pain felt at work. We use answers to the questions on 
specific conditions to identify whether the person suffers from recurrent aches or pains in a) neck, 
cervical spine or shoulders; b) hands or arms; c) lumbar region; or d) legs, including hips. We code 
these answers so that 1 indicates no pain and 0 indicates pain.  
 
The explanatory variable of interest is HIM. Following Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008) we capture four 
different aspects of HIM using dummy variables for them. These indicators are incentive pay for those 
who are personally subject to performance-related pay; training for employees who have participated in 
employer-provided training during the past 12 months; self-managed teams for individuals who work in a 
team that selects its own foreman and decides on the internal division of responsibilities; and information 
sharing for employees who are informed about the changes at work at the planning stage rather than 
                                                 
7 According to the rules of the sickness insurance and labour contracts, the workers get paid during the waiting period, after 
which there is an earnings-related allowance. The replacement rate declines with earnings. According to many labour 
contracts the workers are actually paid for a considerably longer period. However, we do not have information on the 
contracts that the workers in our data belong to, so we cannot tell whether they have received full pay or the allowance 
during their illness. Therefore, we cannot use the replacement rate as an explanatory variable. 
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shortly before the change or at its implementation.8 Other empirical studies (e.g. Frick and Simmons, 
2010) suggest that the particular combination of HIM practices may determine their effects on worker 
wellbeing. We therefore construct a categorical variable “any HIM” for being exposed to any (or any 
combination of several) of the HIM practices, as well as separate indicators for identifying all possible 
combinations of the four HIM practices to fully establish the effects of different “bundles”. 
 
As control variables, we use indicators for gender, age, marital status, educational level, plant size, 
multi-plant firms, foreign ownership, public sector employer and a set of 14 single digit industry 
dummies. All of these variables are based on the data on individuals in QWLS. Furthermore, we have 
several work and earnings history variables for the period 1990-2001. These include the number of past 
job switches (defined as a change of establishment), unemployment episodes (both number of episodes 
and their length in months), past employment months, an indicator for having worked in a large firm 
(firm with more than 300 employees), past average earnings (1990-2001) and past earnings growth 
(average over periods 1999-2000 and 2000-2001). The past earnings data are introduced as the log of 
annual earnings. Earnings include the base wage, overtime pay, bonuses, and wage supplements. All of 
the above work history variables are from the longitudinal register data (FLEED). In addition, we use 
information in the QWLS to measure the length of tenure with current employer and to form an 
indicator for persons who have had more than three different professions over their working life. We 
also control for employees’ past sickness absence history by using the total number of sickness absence 
days over the period 1995-2001, as recorded by KELA.  
 
Finally, we have three job disamenity variables, based on the QWLS. For perceived harms, there is a 
five-point scale in which the highest category corresponds to the perception by a worker that a certain 
feature of working conditions is ‘very much’ an adverse factor at the workplace. Harms include heat, 
cold and dust, among other things. For perceived hazards, the highest category among three 
possibilities is the one in which the respondent considers a certain feature at the workplace as ‘a distinct 
hazard’. Hazards include accident risk, risk of strain injuries and risk of grave work exhaustion, among 
other things. For insecurities, the respondents answer whether certain aspects are insecurity factors or 
not. These aspects include e.g. the threat of temporary dismissal and the threat of unemployment. 
Responses to the questions about adverse working conditions are aggregated by forming a dummy 
                                                 
8 Kauhanen (2009) provides a detailed descriptive account and discussion on the distribution of innovative workplace 
practices among different types of workers in Finland by using the 2003 QWLS. It is possible that employees exposed to 
HIM in 2003 had already earlier been in HIM jobs. However, there has been a rapid expansion of HIM practices in Finland 
during the past 15 years, so the probability of being in a HIM job in 2003 is much higher than in the earlier years.  
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variable that equals one if there is at least one clearly adverse factor (Harm), a dummy that equals one if 
there is at least one distinct hazard (Hazard), and a dummy if there is at least one insecurity factor 
(Uncertainty).9  
 
Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis are presented in Appendix (Table 1A). In 
Table 2A we document the incidence of HIM bundles along with ‘any HIM’. Discussion of the 
estimation results is focused on the bundles that are common enough to support robust conclusions. 
We report the estimates for all the HIM bundles for the sake of completeness. Table 3A reports the 
associations for the HIM bundles along with ‘any HIM’. We report Kendall’s tau-b correlation 
coefficients because all the HIM variables are 0/1-variables. These associations are for the most part 
statistically significant, but small. HIM bundles are positively correlated with ‘any HIM’ but negatively 
correlated with each other, as expected.  
 
4. Estimation results 
 
4.1. Basic results 
 
As discussed earlier, those taking HIM jobs may be healthier than other workers if HIM jobs are more 
demanding than non-HIM jobs and, recognising this, employers select and allocate workers 
accordingly. To examine this proposition we first established whether absence histories are related to 
current self-assessed working capacity. It was indeed the case that absence history had a significant 
negative relationship with working capacity.10 Next we examined the relationship between previous 
absences and current HIM status. The results from probit estimations revealed that sickness absence 
history over the period 1995-2002 was not related to current exposure to any of the four HIM practices 
in our data.11 
                                                 
9 A full description of these variables is available in Böckerman and Ilmakunnas (2008). 
10 We estimated this relationship using an ordered probit model containing the controls for demographic characteristics 
used throughout the paper. The marginal effect for the probability of the top category of working capacity was -0.0011 with 
a robust standard error of 0.00016. This implies that one standard deviation change in absence history reduces the 
probability of being in the top category by 4%. The economic significance of this effect is therefore noticeable. 
11 Sickness absence histories were statistically non-significant in probits explaining any HIM practice v. none, any profit 
related pay (i.e. in any combination with other practices) v. no HIM, any training v. no HIM, any self-managed teams v. no 
HIM, and any information sharing v. no HIM. In the probit specification in which we explained the exposure to ‘any HIM v 
none’ the variable for sickness absence history obtained marginal effect -0.0000309 with robust standard error 0.000161. 
Thus, the point estimate was very close to zero and the non-significance was clearly not being driven by a particularly large 
standard error. This was also the case with the other HIM variables. We also investigated the impact of very recent sickness 
 
 
16
Next we turn to the relationship between HIM practices and sickness absences. Table 1 (Panel A) 
shows the average marginal effects from a probit model for having any absences, where the dependent 
variable is based on absences reported in QWLS 2003. The columns refer to different control sets, 
starting from the baseline model that includes only an indicator for being exposed to any HIM practice 
(v. none), and then successively adding sickness absence history, employment history, personal and firm 
characteristics, and finally the three measures of job disamenities.12 This allows us to test for the 
significance of sickness absence histories as we load in more information to the models. It is 
particularly useful to explore the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of job disamenities in the final 
column because it is possible that these variables are picking up stressful outcomes that we measure via 
sickness absence, at least to some degree. The tables only report the average marginal effects for the 
HIM variables.  
 
HIM practices are associated with a 5 per cent increase in the probability of having a sickness absence 
spell (Table 1, Panel A, Columns 1-3). However, when demographic and employer characteristics are 
included the estimate drops and loses significance. This remains the case when we add job disamenities 
in Column 5 that constitutes our preferred estimate. This is natural, since the absences are often related 
to job hazards and stress factors.  
 
==== TABLE 1 HERE ==== 
 
In Panel B we use the total number of absence spells as the dependent variable. Since this is a count, 
but has a very high concentration of zeros, we use zero inflated negative binominal models in the 
estimation. Overdispersion tests clearly showed that the overdispersion parameter differed statistically 
                                                                                                                                                                  
absence history (over the period 2000-2002) before QWLS 2003, because it is arguably more easily observable to the current 
employer and thus could have a larger impact on the allocation of workers into various tasks. The recent absence history 
was not statistically significant in any of the models. For the recent sickness absence history (2000-2002) the marginal effect 
was -0.0001615 with robust standard error 0.0003367 using the main specification of ‘any HIM v none’. Furthermore, we 
excluded the employment history variables from the set of controls, because employment and sickness absence history may 
be closely related. This did not have any significant effect on the estimates. However, work history is an important 
determinant of current HIM status. Those employees with ‘good’ work histories are much more likely to be found in HIM 
jobs. These effects are fully explored in our related research.  
12 The individuals exposed to HIM and those not exposed are not strikingly dissimilar in terms of their observable 
characteristics. We used propensity score matching and found that the number of observations out of common support is 
very low. In the baseline specifications that use ‘any HIM v none’ between 0.2 and 1.0 per cent of employees are lost 
through the enforcement of common support. This implies that the estimation of specifications conditional on common 
support produces very similar results. 
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significantly from zero and Vuong tests revealed that we have to use zero inflated models.13 The 
coefficient for any HIM practice is positive and statistically significant across all model specifications. 
However, Panels C and D reveal that the effect is driven by the total number of short absence spells 
(spells that lasted less than 4 days). HIM is positively correlated with the number of short absence spells 
in all specifications, but it remains negative and non-significant for long absence spells (spells that 
lasted 4 days or more).14 This is consistent with the possible effects of HIM practices discussed in 
Section Two above.15  
 
We also estimated models for the number of days of absence reported by KELA, a probit for having 
any absences, and a zero inflated negative binominal model for the number of absence days in 2003. 
The probit showed positive, but non-significant marginal effects for HIM, while in the negative 
binominal model the marginal effects were negative and remained statistically non-significant 
throughout as we loaded in more controls (results not reported). Since all KELA absences are relatively 
long spells, the non-significant effects are fully consistent with the results for longer spells (4 days or 
more) using the QWLS data in Panel C of Table 1.  
 
In Table 2 we rerun the short absences model from Table 1 but this time we consider the effects of a 
full set of different “bundles” of the four HIM practices on the number of short absence spells. All 
combinations of the four HIM practices are included in the models. The reference group in all of the 
specifications is no HIM practices. The most robust results across all model specifications are the 
associations of absences with PRP and training in isolation and with the combination of PRP and 
employer-provided training. Those aspects of HIM are strongly related to a higher number of short 
absences. In the preferred model (Column 5) that includes all the controls also the bundles that consists 
                                                 
13 Under overdispersion the estimated parameters from a Poisson model are consistent, but the standard errors are not. 
Using the zero inflated Poisson model with sandwich standard errors gave results that were fairly close to those from the 
zero inflated negative binomial model. 
14 Table 4A documents the full estimation results for the specification in Column 5 of Panel B of Table 1. Absence history 
over the period 1995-2001 is a strong predictor of the probability of absence in 2003. The results for the standard control 
variables are very similar compared to the ones in a study using the 1997 QWLS (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2008). There 
is evidence that females have more absences and older employees have fewer absence spells although they have longer 
absences measured by absence days (see also Ilmakunnas et al., 2010, for age effects on absenteeism in the QWLS data). We 
also find that the role of working conditions is pronounced. 
15 We obtained evidence to support this also by estimating a model for the total number of absence days, conditionally on a 
positive number of days. One can think of the probit model and this model for positive days as a two-part model. To 
guarantee that the predictions are positive, the model was estimated using the logarithm of the number of days as the 
dependent variable. The HIM coefficient was negative, which is consistent with HIM increasing short absences. 
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of “PRP and self-managed teams” and “PRP, self-managed teams and information sharing” are 
statistically significant. However, these are very rare bundles, as shown in Table 2A.  
 
Some of these effects are quantitatively large, as indicated by the average marginal effects reported in 
Table 2. PRP alone, for example, increases the number of short absence spells by 40-50%, depending 
on the model specification.16 The link between PRP and more short absences is intuitive since PRP can 
be thought to involve work intensification. However, the positive link to training is somewhat 
surprising. A plausible explanation is that on-the-job training is almost always accompanied by changes 
or adjustments in work roles and it is these, rather than training per se, that generates increased short 
absences. Alternatively, if training reduces the amount of “down-time” at work, it could be linked to 
labour intensification. We examined the link between HIM bundles and work intensification by running 
a model equivalent to that in Column 4 in Table 2 where the dependent variable was agreement with 
the statement that “time pressure increases sickness absence” (Table 5A, Column 1) on a five-point 
Likert scale. Those exposed to PRP, training or a combination of the two were most likely to agree to 
the statement, further supporting the proposition that, at least for a subset of HIM practices, attendant 
work intensification was significantly associated with a higher probability of absence. 
 
==== TABLE 2 HERE ==== 
 
We repeated the same kind of analysis as in Table 2 also for the number of long absence spells. Overall, 
the HIM bundles seemed to have no significant connection to long spells (not reported). When all 
controls were included, “PRP only” was the only HIM variable with a significant coefficient. Its 
relationship to spells was positive, so that PRP seems to increase both short and long spells, but when 
used in combination with other HIM practices, the effect is confined to short spells.  
 
Under the theoretical arguments presented in Section Two this positive association between HIM and 
short-term absence taking is related to HIM employers’ ability to call on the multi-tasking skills of HIM 
workers to avoid replacement labour costs, something that is not available to non-HIM employers. We 
can test for this relationship directly with our data. Employees are asked whether they agree with the 
statement: “Replacements are not hired to cover temporary absences?” The probit model results 
presented in Table 5A (Column 2) reveal very clearly that replacements are least likely to be hired where 
                                                 
16 For example, with all the controls individuals with PRP only have exp(0.3596)=1.4328 times the number of absences of 
workers with no HIM.  
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PRP and/or training are present, thus lending support to the argument that the shadow price of short-
term absence to the employer is somewhat lower in these circumstances. 
 
Table 3 repeats the analyses in Table 2 but for having had work accidents leading to absence in the last 
12 months. In many ways the results are the mirror image of those in Table 3: those “bundles” 
associated with a higher incidence of short-term absences are also associated with fewer accidents. PRP 
and training are the practices most likely to be associated with fewer accidents, the most robust result 
being the negative association between accidents and the “bundle” of PRP plus training. With all 
controls, “PRP only” and the bundle “PRP and training” were the only significant ones: both HIM 
regimes were negatively associated with the probability of accidents. The effects are sizeable given that 
slightly fewer than 5 per cent of the sample have had accidents (Table 1A). As noted earlier, HIM 
practices lead to work intensification, but also to increased control over the working environment. The 
former may increase accident rates, but the latter should have an opposite effect. Our finding is 
therefore consistent with increased control dominating intensification.  
 
==== TABLE 3 HERE ==== 
 
To explore the relationships between absences, accidents and HIM a little further we ran bivariate 
probit models where the two dependent variables were dummies for having any spell of short-term 
absence and for having any accident leading to sickness absence. The motivation for this specification 
is that there may be some common shocks that that affects both accidents and absence. This may pose 
a problem for inference in the single equation models. The controls and model specifications were 
identical to those presented in Columns 5 of Tables 2 and 3. There was a highly statistically significant 
rho identifying a positive unobserved correlation between short absences and accidents (not reported). 
The positive estimate of rho was also robust to model specification. This is something we would fully 
expect since employees suffering an accident at work will often need to take a short absence to 
recuperate. Having accounted for this correlation the results presented in Tables 2 and 3 were 
confirmed. The links between HIM “bundles” containing PRP or training and a higher probability of 
short-term absence were very well-determined, as were the links between these practices and a reduced 
likelihood of an accident. 
 
The negative relationship between PRP and training bundles and accidents, on the one hand, and their 
positive association with short absences is consistent with a safer working environment in which 
accidents are less likely and employees are encouraged not to practice “presenteeism” whereby they 
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turn up for work even when they are not fully fit. This interpretation is also consistent with the fact that 
PRP has a much stronger effect on short absence spells than on long ones. It is plausible that accidents 
lead more often to long rather than short absences from work. 
 
In Table 4 we turn to subjective indicators of worker wellbeing and pain. The entries in the table are 
again the average marginal effects of the HIM variables on various wellbeing measures from separate 
specifications which use the full set of controls used in the penultimate columns of Tables 2 and 3, that 
is, they exclude job disamenities.17 Each column corresponds to a different dependent variable. In 
Columns 1-3 and 8 the dependent variables are ordered categories, so we use ordered probit models 
and present average marginal effects on the probability of the top category. In Columns 4-7 the 
dependent pain measure variables are binary, so we use probit models and the average marginal effects 
from these models give the impact on the probability of not having the negative symptoms.  
 
==== TABLE 4 HERE ==== 
 
Eleven of the fifteen HIM regimes have a positive, statistically significant association with job 
satisfaction, and none were negatively associated with job satisfaction (Column 1). It is clear, therefore, 
that HIM is positively associated with employee positive affect. Column 8 provides overwhelming 
evidence that HIM is also associated with a lower likelihood of being tired: nine of the fifteen HIM 
regimes were positively associated with not feeling tired at work. On the other hand, only three HIM 
regimes were consistently associated with a lower likelihood of feeling pain on at least three of the four 
types of pain recorded in the survey. All three of these “bundles” included training and information 
sharing. HIM positive associations with work capacity and self-assessed state of one’s health were less 
evident. The HIM “bundle” most consistently associated with employees’ wellbeing is the “bundle” 
containing PRP, training and information sharing. It has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship to all wellbeing outcomes in Table 5 with the exception of no neck pain. 
 
In general there is little evidence of HIM being associated with poorer employee wellbeing. But there is 
one exception: the combination of PRP and team working is associated with having a lower self-
assessed working capacity, having a lower assessment of one’s own state of health, and feeling more 
tired.18 Although we are not able to conclude that there is a causal relationship between exposure to 
team working allied to PRP and poorer employee wellbeing, this correlation is independent of a 
                                                 
17 The results reported in Table 4 are not sensitive to the inclusion of job disamenities. 
18 Note that this is not a very common bundle. 
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particularly rich set of controls, including employee demographic characteristics, the nature of the 
workplace, and the employees’ own absence, work and earnings histories. It is also consistent with the 
proposition that PRP coupled with team working can incentivise workers who respond by working 
more intensively. The fact that this negative relationship does not show up in other bundles including 
these two HIM practices suggests that the effects are ameliorated when combined with training and 
information sharing. 
 
4.2. Additional aspects 
 
To evaluate the earlier results, we have estimated alternative specifications. We briefly discuss these 
results without presenting them in tables. Another line of the literature - the share capitalism strand 
emphasises the distinction between individual performance pay, on the one hand, and group, team or 
firm-based performance pay on the other (Kruse et al., 2010). It is argued that it is really the latter that 
inculcates cohesion and a team-working orientation. We constructed indicators for both group (team) 
and organization based PRP using information on what kind of bonuses the person receives. 
Organization based PRP is clearly the most important component of PRP in Finland. Twice as many 
employees are paid organization based bonuses compared to team based PRP. The estimations with the 
new indicators showed that the results for PRP in the tables that use specific bundles are for the most 
part driven by organization based PRP. We also tested whether the specifications that use ‘any HIM v 
none’ are sensitive to the definition of PRP. The key result of the paper according to which HIM status 
is positively correlated with the number of short absence spells, but remains non-significant for long 
absence spells, obtained support also when ‘any HIM v none’ was defined based on organization based 
PRP. 
 
The basic models do not include occupational controls, because it is not possible to identify all of them 
especially in the specifications that use the comprehensive set of HIM bundles. We conducted 
robustness tests that included 2-digit occupational indicators to control for potential heterogeneity 
among occupations. Their inclusion did not change the conclusions.  
 
If work organization affects claims for sickness allowance, it is possible that absence history is 
correlated with HIM and therefore may not be a good control variable. We checked whether the 
correlation between absences according to KELA and absences according to QWLS is independent 
from HIM status in 2003, regressing QWLS absences on KELA absences. Exclusion/inclusion of HIM 
status in 2003 as a variable in the regression had only a very small influence on the relationship between 
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the two absence variables. This gives evidence for HIM not affecting the allowance claims. The 
conclusion was not sensitive to the use of individual and employer controls in the regression. 
 
To downplay the potential impact of confounding factors, we have used an unusually extensive vector 
of control variables in the specifications, including employees’ comprehensive work and absence 
histories that account for sorting of employees into HIM status. However, this is not ideal to fully 
establish causality. To shed further light on the causal effects, we used the lagged incidence of HIM in 
the same 2-digit industry cell in 1997 to instrument for exposure to HIM in 2003.19 The idea is that 
HIM is a technology which diffuses across time and space according to certain structural features of 
firms and their peers, e.g. via networks, or as an experience good, or through herding mentality. This 
affects the propensity of specific firms to deploy HIM. However, having conditioned on the full set of 
detailed industry effects, there is no reason to suspect any effect of lagged industry HIM on current 
worker wellbeing. The first stage of these IV models worked well. The F-test statistics were well above 
10 that is the threshold proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) for a weak instrument. Thus, any HIM in 
the industry in 1997 is a strong predictor for a person being exposed to any HIM in 2003. We estimated 
linear probability models with the IV approach for specifications that corresponded to Panel A of 
Table 1. The original results remained intact. Thus, there was a positive and significant effect in models 
corresponding to Columns 1-3 of Panel A, but the estimate turned non-significant in specifications 
corresponding to Columns 4-5. The point estimates were larger, but the standard errors were also 
(much) larger, as expected. For the count models corresponding to Panels B-D of Table 1 we applied 
GMM. There were some differences in the results, but still the basic pattern clearly remained the same.  
 
We also estimated a set of recursive bivariate probit models in which the dependent variable of the first 
equation was any HIM (2003) and the explanatory variables were any HIM in the same industry cell 
(1997) and the controls. In the second equation the dependent variable was any absence and the 
explanatory variables were any HIM (2003) and the controls. We estimated these models with different 
set of controls as in Table 1. The pattern of results remained exactly the same as in Table 1. Thus, any 
HIM (2003) was positive and significant in specifications similar to Columns 1-3, but non-significant in 
specifications similar to Columns 4-5.20 This suggests that unobservables are not driving the results in 
Table 1. 
 
                                                 
19 The QWLS data is available for both 2003 and 1997. 
20 The correlation between the error terms of the equations was negative in all specifications.   
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To explore the potential heterogeneity in the effects, we estimated separate specifications for females 
and males and for young (aged less than 45) and old (aged 45 or more) workers. It is useful to study the 
relationships in these groups, because the prevalence of sickness absence is at much higher level for 
females and old workers. Generally, there were no large differences in the results between different 
groups of workers. However, the effect of HIM practices on experiencing no pain in neck was not 
significant for the young workers. This finding is not particularly surprising, because the prevalence of 
neck pain is much higher for the older workers. We also estimated a set of specifications separately for 
blue-collar workers and white-collar workers, defined based on socio-economic status (2000) from 
FLEED. The most interesting finding was that the white-collar workers are a very heterogeneous group 
in terms of accidents. The share of accidents is roughly 3% for the lower while-collar workers, but they 
are practically non-existent for the upper white-collar workers. For the lower white-collar workers the 
negative effect of HIM practices on accidents seemed to be somewhat larger than in the full sample 
(without adding all the controls to the model). Finally, we split the full sample by using the Harm and 
Hazard variables and experimented with different ways to define workers who are facing substantial 
risk at the workplace. We obtained a very clear-cut result that the negative effect of HIM practices on 
accidents was roughly twice the effect in the full sample (after adding all the controls) if workers who 
are “at risk” were defined as those who have experiencing both harms and hazards at their workplaces. 
Thus, the protective effects of HIM practices are clearly more pronounced for those who are in the 
zone of risk. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Using nationally representative survey data for Finnish employees linked to register data on their work, 
wage and sickness absence histories we observe that high involvement management (HIM) practices 
are generally positively and significantly associated with various aspects of employee wellbeing. In 
particular, HIM is strongly associated with higher evaluations of subjective wellbeing including higher 
job satisfaction and non-tiredness. HIM is also associated with a lower probability of having a 
workplace accident. However, HIM exposure - especially performance-related pay and training - is also 
associated with having more short absence spells.  
 
We tackle the problem that workers are not randomly assigned to HIM by using an innovative 
combination of survey and register data. In the empirical specifications work and sickness absence 
histories of the employees are used to control for individual effects that might be correlated with 
exposure to HIM. This extension of previous analyses brings two important insights. First, we show 
that links between HIM exposure and worker wellbeing are not for the most part biased by the 
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omission of work and sickness absence histories. Second, it is nevertheless very important to control 
for work and sickness absence histories since conditioning on them has a sizeable quantitative impact 
on the HIM coefficients in our models. The estimates of HIM on employee wellbeing can be 
substantially upwardly biased without these controls that account for sorting of employees into HIM 
status. 
 
The positive association between HIM and the incidence of short absence spells is consistent with the 
view that for firms using HIM practices zero absences may not be optimal. Rather, the optimal absence 
rate may involve short spells if the firm can meet production schedules by intensifying work using 
multi-tasking workers. On the other hand, avoiding long absences is likely to be beneficial for all firms. 
We find no strong evidence that HIM reduces the number of long-term absences, but we do find clear 
evidence that HIM practices are associated with a lower probability of having accidents at work.  
 
Our results are rather positive from the employee point of view whereas the previous literature presents 
more mixed findings. It is plausible that the co-operation between employees and employers which 
characterises employment relations in Finland, together with the strong role of trade unions in 
implementing work reorganization, results in mutual gains for firms and workers (see also Kalmi and 
Kauhanen, 2008). That said the combination of PRP and team working, which is central to notions of 
devolved responsibilities underpinned by incentive structures, is also the HIM “bundle” most clearly 
associated with negative outcomes for employee wellbeing. 
 
Short-term absences and workplace accidents have positively correlated unobservable components, but 
the former is positively and the latter negatively correlated with HIM. This result might be driven by 
unobservable features of the working environment, such as having a “good” employer capable of 
investing in HIM, keeping absences low and minimising accidents all by virtue of good management 
rather than HIM per se. Future research on this issue would benefit from taking into account employer 
unobserved heterogeneity which may simultaneously affect worker wellbeing and the propensity for 
HIM adoption.21 Our data have only a few observations from many of the firms, thus preventing us 
from exploring this issue. 
 
                                                 
21 Dionne and Dostie (2007) is an example of a linked employer-employee data study where employer heterogeneity in 
absenteeism is accounted for. 
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Table 1 Innovative workplace practices as determinant of sickness absence (QWLS) 
 
 Baseline Sickness absence 
history 
Sickness absence 
history + Work 
history 
Sickness absence 
history + Work 
history + Controls 
Sickness absence 
history + Work 
history + Controls + 
Job disamenities 
Panel A: Any absence, probit      
Any HIM v none  0.0455** 0.0464** 0.0466** 0.0251 0.0316 
 (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0195) 
Panel B: Total number of absence 
spells, zero infl. negative binomial 
regression 
     
Any HIM v none 0.1375** 0.1443** 0.1581** 0.1238* 0.1483** 
 (0.0694) (0.0691) (0.0680) (0.0687) (0.0668) 
Panel C: Total number of long 
absence spells, zero infl. negative 
binomial regression 
     
Any HIM v none -0.0451 -0.0357 -0.0407 -0.0024 0.0174 
 (0.0370) (0.0371) (0.0363) (0.0314) (0.0264) 
Panel D: Total number of short 
absence spells, zero infl. negative 
binomial regression 
     
Any HIM v none 0.1931*** 0.1930*** 0.2048*** 0.1388** 0.1460*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0533) (0.0533) (0.0556) (0.0550) 
 
Notes: In Panel A the dependent variable is the indicator for a positive number of absence in QWLS 2003. In Panel B the dependent variable is the total number of sickness 
absence spells in QWLS 2003. In Panel C long absences are those that have lasted for 4 days or more and in Panel D short absences are those that have lasted 1-3 days. Sickness 
absence history refers to the total number of sickness absence days over the period 1995-2001, as recorded by KELA. Work history refers to variables that describe past labour 
market experiences. Controls that are included from Column 4 onwards consist of the individual and employer characteristics described in Table 1A along with a full set of 
industry indicators. Job disamenities refer to Harm, Hazard and Uncertainty, as explained in the text. The specifications in Column 1 contain the HIM indicator only. Average 
marginal effects and robust standard errors reported. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N = 3755. 
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Table 2 Innovative workplace practices as determinant of short absence spells: specific bundles 
 
 Baseline Sickness absence 
history 
Sickness absence 
history + Work 
history 
Sickness absence 
history + Work 
history + 
Controls 
Sickness absence 
history + Work 
history + 
Controls + Job 
disamenities 
Total number of short absence spells, zero infl. 
negative binomial regression 
     
      
PRP only  0.3944** 0.3824** 0.4800*** 0.3780*** 0.3596*** 
 (0.1867) (0.1718) (0.1826) (0.1473) (0.1404) 
PRP and training 1.5947** 0.3343*** 0.3397*** 0.2047** 0.2067** 
 (0.7872) (0.0961) (0.0989) (0.0987) (0.0970) 
PRP, training and self-managed teams 1.6266* 2.5285*** 1.8097*** 0.9710 1.0294 
 (0.8999) (0.9440) (0.6951) (0.6012) (0.7148) 
All four HIM practices 0.3635 0.3579 0.3965 0.2598 0.2927 
  (0.3968) (0.2256) (0.2491) (0.2622) (0.2501) 
PRP, self-managed teams and information sharing   0.7459* 0.7266 0.7539 0.6155 0.7193* 
 (0.4224) (0.4428) (0.4724) (0.4554) (0.4133) 
PRP and information sharing 0.0710 0.0864 0.1500 0.1250 0.1583 
 (0.1414) (0.1400) (0.1464) (0.1469) (0.1484) 
PRP, training and information sharing 0.9200* 1.7834*** 1.7420*** 1.0096* 0.8919 
 (0.4982) (0.6385) (0.6635) (0.6050) (0.5564) 
PRP and self-managed teams  1.2752** 1.1945** 1.3944*** 1.1094*** 0.8753** 
 (0.5674) (0.4970) (0.4989) (0.3987) (0.3687) 
Training only 0.2948*** 0.2890*** 0.3222*** 0.2518*** 0.2131*** 
 (0.0915) (0.0854) (0.0880) (0.0792) (0.0762) 
Training and self-managed teams  1.5752* 2.4591*** 1.7442*** 1.0132* 1.0632 
 (0.8503) (0.9022) (0.6621) (0.5765) (0.6872) 
Training, self-managed teams and information sharing 0.0860 1.3245** 0.8559** 0.5770 0.6561 
 (0.1528) (0.5233) (0.3574) (0.3537) (0.4104) 
Training and information sharing 0.0953 0.0748 0.1184 0.0642 0.1066 
 (0.3516) (0.1163) (0.2679) (0.1574) (0.2067) 
Self-managed teams only  -0.0168 -0.0807 0.0106 0.0504 0.1144 
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 (2.3194) (0.1683) (0.1773) (0.1921) (0.2044) 
Self-managed teams and information sharing  -0.2292 -0.2413 0.3172 0.2460 0.2825 
 (0.2947) (0.2437) (0.3663) (0.3478) (0.3705) 
Information sharing only -0.2045 0.4287 0.3968 0.2124 0.2929 
 (0.1355) (0.9026) (0.2671) (0.2504) (0.2999) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the total number of short absences, defined as those that have lasted 1-3 days. The reference category is no HIM. See also notes to Table 1. 
Average marginal effects and robust standard errors reported. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N = 3755. 
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Table 3 Innovative workplace practices as determinant of accidents: specific bundles 
 
 Baseline Sickness 
absence history 
Sickness 
absence history 
+ Work 
history 
Sickness 
absence history 
+ Work 
history + 
Controls 
Sickness 
absence history 
+ Work 
history + 
Controls + Job 
disamenities 
Person has had an accident, 
probit 
     
      
PRP only  -0.0110 -0.0110 -0.0126 -0.0237* -0.0260** 
 (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0133) 
PRP and training -0.0554*** -0.0554*** -0.0548*** -0.0501*** -0.0511*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0152) 
All four HIM practices -0.0607 -0.0606 -0.0498 -0.0363 -0.0369 
  (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0428) (0.0419) (0.0407) 
PRP, self-managed teams and 
information sharing   
-0.0128 -0.0128 -0.0204 -0.0259 -0.0185 
 (0.0500) (0.0500) (0.0458) (0.0429) (0.0419) 
PRP and information sharing -0.0114 -0.0115 -0.0132 -0.0103 -0.0061 
 (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0193) (0.0196) (0.0196) 
PRP, training and information 
sharing 
-0.0445*** -0.0445*** -0.0409** -0.0282 -0.0232 
 (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0177) (0.0177) 
PRP and self-managed teams  0.0221 0.0217 0.0240 0.0217 0.0086 
 (0.0404) (0.0406) (0.0407) (0.0408) (0.0394) 
Training only -0.0320*** -0.0320*** -0.0255** -0.0123 -0.0158 
 (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0105) 
Training and self-managed teams  -0.0112 -0.0111 -0.0020 -0.0126 0.0095 
 (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0205) 
Training, self-managed teams and 
information sharing 
-0.0899** -0.0899** -0.0781** -0.0463 -0.0398 
 (0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0390) (0.0401) (0.0400) 
Training and information sharing -0.0478*** -0.0477*** -0.0382*** -0.0113 -0.0076 
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 (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0137) 
Self-managed teams only  -0.0104 -0.0104 -0.0095 -0.0074 -0.0055 
 (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0264) 
Self-managed teams and 
information sharing  
-0.0337 -0.0336 -0.0300 -0.0154 -0.0114 
 (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0329) (0.0319) (0.0308) 
Information sharing only -0.0278** -0.0278** -0.0256* -0.0178 -0.0125 
 (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0138) (0.0135) (0.0134) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the indicator whether a person has had an accident at work which has resulted in absence from work in 
the last 12 months. The combination “PRP, training and self-managed teams” is not included among the explanatory variables, because 
there is no variation in the outcome. See also notes to Table 1. Average marginal effects and robust standard errors reported. Statistical 
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N = 3755. 
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Table 4 Innovative workplace practices as determinant of subjective wellbeing: specific bundles 
 
 Job 
satisfaction 
Working 
capacity 
The state of 
health 
No pain in 
neck 
No pain in 
arms 
No pain in 
lumbar  
No pain in 
legs 
Not being 
tired 
PRP only  0.0115 0.0127 -0.0503 -0.0119 0.0014 0.0355 0.0261 0.0361 
 (0.0310) (0.0260) (0.0340) (0.0346) (0.0289) (0.0324) (0.0293) (0.0231) 
PRP and training 0.0753** 0.0124 0.0304 0.0349 0.0416 0.0362 0.0281 0.0261 
 (0.0302) (0.0221) (0.0290) (0.0313) (0.0268) (0.0291) (0.0267) (0.0202) 
PRP, training and 
self-managed teams
0.0902 -0.0031 -0.0394 -0.0181 0.0154 0.1739* 0.0121 0.0553 
 (0.0652) (0.0493) (0.0804) (0.0861) (0.0719) (0.0955) (0.0730) (0.0653) 
All four HIM 
practices 
0.3297*** 0.0283 -0.0639 0.0719 0.0969 -0.0051 0.0809 0.1067* 
  (0.0767) (0.0514) (0.0804) (0.0777) (0.0731) (0.0719) (0.0738) (0.0548) 
PRP, self-managed 
teams and 
information sharing  
0.2570* 0.1754* 0.1442 0.1097 0.0890 0.0559 0.1634 0.0204 
 (0.1317) (0.0949) (0.0942) (0.1253) (0.1089) (0.1133) (0.1218) (0.0822) 
PRP and 
information sharing
0.2176*** 0.0538 0.0104 -0.0057 0.0343 0.0567 -0.0001 0.0954*** 
 (0.0493) (0.0382) (0.0493) (0.0498) (0.0434) (0.0469) (0.0411) (0.0365) 
PRP, training and 
information sharing
0.2374*** 0.0784*** 0.1023*** 0.0464 0.0601* 0.0911*** 0.0769** 0.1365*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0272) (0.0337) (0.0372) (0.0328) (0.0356) (0.0330) (0.0293) 
PRP and self-
managed teams  
0.1191 -0.1813*** -0.2546** 0.1040 -0.0292 -0.0585 -0.0530 -0.0769* 
 (0.1152) (0.0271) (0.1029) (0.1259) (0.0931) (0.1126) (0.0995) (0.0440) 
Training only 0.0082 -0.0113 -0.0456* 0.0113 -0.0363* -0.0220 -0.0175 0.0104 
 (0.0226) (0.0174) (0.0244) (0.0253) (0.0208) (0.0232) (0.0209) (0.0163) 
Training and self-
managed teams  
0.1928*** 0.0151 -0.0790 0.0412 0.0377 0.0824 0.0878* 0.1146*** 
 (0.0505) (0.0393) (0.0554) (0.0550) (0.0463) (0.0521) (0.0466) (0.0402) 
Training, self-
managed teams and 
information sharing
0.2627*** 0.0540 0.1204** 0.1216** 0.1183** 0.1448*** 0.1328*** 0.1891*** 
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 (0.0512) (0.0401) (0.0537) (0.0551) (0.0528) (0.0561) (0.0507) (0.0421) 
Training and 
information sharing
0.2261*** 0.0754*** 0.0535* 0.1009*** 0.0429* 0.0513* 0.0723*** 0.1168*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0223) (0.0281) (0.0296) (0.0253) (0.0278) (0.0254) (0.0219) 
Self-managed teams 
only  
0.1055* -0.0319 0.0443 0.0564 -0.0007 0.0085 0.0017 0.1677*** 
 (0.0585) (0.0336) (0.0555) (0.0638) (0.0517) (0.0569) (0.0520) (0.0530) 
Self-managed teams 
and information 
sharing  
0.2549*** 0.0553 0.0509 0.0108 0.1911** 0.1303* 0.0233 0.1134** 
 (0.0717) (0.0552) (0.0711) (0.0715) (0.0792) (0.0698) (0.0604) (0.0562) 
Information sharing 
only 
0.1046*** 0.0425* 0.0452 0.0753** 0.0290 -0.0042 0.0471* 0.0845*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0241) (0.0304) (0.0327) (0.0274) (0.0297) (0.0269) (0.0244) 
 
Notes: All specifications include individual and employer characteristics and work history variables as controls along with a full set of industry indicators. All models also 
control for sickness absence history. The specifications in Columns 1-3 and Column 8 are estimated by using ordered probit and the specifications in Columns 4-7 are 
estimated by using probit. Average marginal effects and robust standard errors reported. For ordered probit models the marginal effects are reported for the probability of the 
top category. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N = 3755. 
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Appendix 1. The Finnish sickness insurance system. 
 
When an employee becomes sick, he/she has to provide a doctor’s note on sick leave, usually after the 
first day of sickness. After the first day, there is a nine working days’ (including Saturdays, but not 
Sundays or public holidays) waiting period until the employee is eligible to sickness allowance from the 
Social Insurance Institution (KELA). During this period, the employee gets his/her pay from the 
employer, if the employment relationship has lasted at least a month. If it has lasted less than a month, 
the employee obtains 50% of the pay. This waiting period is waived if the same sickness has already 
caused absence in the previous 30 days.  
 
After the waiting period the employee starts to get an earnings-related sickness allowance. However, 
most labour contracts stipulate that the firms actually continue to pay the employees much longer than 
the waiting period. The length of the pay usually depends on length of tenure. For example, according 
to the metal workers’ contract, workers with tenure over one month but less than 3 years are paid for 
28 calendar days, workers with tenure of at least 3 years but less than 5 years are paid for 35 days, those 
with tenure of at least 5 but less than 10 years are paid for 42 days, and the workers with at least 10 
years’ tenure get paid for 56 calendar days. The exact rules vary across contracts. When the employees 
get their pay even after the waiting period, the employer gets the sickness allowance. 
 
After 60 work days (approximately 80 calendar days) on sickness allowance there is an assessment of 
rehabilitation needs. If the employee goes to rehabilitation, sickness allowance ends and he/she gets 
rehabilitation allowance. The maximum period for sickness allowance is 300 working days 
(approximately a full calendar year); all allowance days within the last 2 years are counted to this. After 
this maximum has been reached, there is an assessment of eligibility to disability pension. The person 
can get sickness allowance again only after having worked for at least a year. 
 
The sickness allowance is based on past earnings (previous year or previous months if earnings have 
increased). Work-related expenses are deducted from earnings, and in addition a deduction is made to 
account for pension and unemployment insurance contributions. In 2003 (the year of the QWLS 
survey from which we have also the survey information on absences) the allowance was calculated in 
the following way. A 4.8% deduction of earnings was first used for the insurance contributions. There 
was no daily allowance if annual earnings were below € 1004; in the range € 1004-26124 the allowance 
was 0.7*earnings/300; in the range € 26125-40192 it was 60.96 + 0.4*(earnings-26124)/300; finally for 
annual earnings over € 40192 the daily allowance was 79.71 + 0.25*(earnings-40192)/300. Therefore, 
the replacement rate falls with earnings. Those receiving no allowance or a very low one could get 
minimum allowance € 11.45 after 55 days’ sickness. Over time, there have been changes in the earnings 
limits and replacement rates.  
 
Source: KELA (The Social Insurance Institution of Finland), A Guide to Benefits 2003 
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Appendix Table 1A. Descriptive statistics of the variables. 
 
Variable Average
Standard 
Deviation Source 
  
Outcomes  
Sickness absence  
Any absence days, dummy 0.6028 0.4894 QWLS 
Total number of absence days  8.6787 21.6096 QWLS 
Total number of absence spells  1.3580 1.9036 QWLS 
Any absence days, dummy 0.1211 0.3263 KELA 
Total number of absence days 3.2351 15.5850 KELA 
Accidents  
Has had an accident at work which has resulted 
in absence from work in the last 12 months  0.0495 0.2169 QWLS 
Subjective wellbeing  
Job satisfaction 3.2464 0.5989 QWLS 
Working capacity 8.5673 1.3348 QWLS 
The state of health 4.4023 0.7724 QWLS 
No pain in neck 0.5666 0.4956 QWLS 
No pain in arms 0.7599 0.4272 QWLS 
No pain in lumbar 0.6901 0.4625 QWLS 
No pain in legs 0.7559 0.4296 QWLS 
Not being tired 4.6231 1.1695 QWLS 
Sickness absence history  
The total number of sickness absence days 14.695 40.755 KELA 
Work history   
N of job switches 1.7816 1.5464 FLEED 
N of employment months 102.6729 45.1923 FLEED 
N of unemployment months  8.6227 15.9072 FLEED 
Ever worked in the manufacturing sector 0.2493 0.4327 BR 
Ever worked in a firm with over 300 workers 0.2930 0.4552 BR 
N of layoff episodes 0.3041 0.9464 FLEED 
Past average earnings 6.3748 1.5636 FLEED 
Past average earnings change 0.1119 0.4972 FLEED 
Worked over 10 years with the current employer 0.4027 0.4905 QWLS 
Had over 3 professions over working life 0.1423 0.3494 QWLS 
Controls  
Individual  
Female 0.5230 0.4995 QWLS 
Age <=34 0.2811 0.4496 QWLS 
Age 35-44 (ref.) 0.2612 0.4394 QWLS 
Age 45-54 0.2959 0.4565 QWLS 
Age 55-64 0.1616 0.3681 QWLS 
Married 0.7506 0.4327 QWLS 
Comprehensive education only (ref.) 0.1663 0.3724 QWLS 
Sedondary education 0.4381 0.4962 QWLS 
Polytechnic education 0.2800 0.4491 QWLS 
University education 0.1155 0.3197 QWLS 
Union member 0.7911 0.4066 QWLS 
Usual weekly hours 34.2205 7.1307 QWLS 
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Employer  
Plant size < 10 (ref.) 0.2290 0.4202 QWLS 
Plant size 10-49 0.3725 0.4835 QWLS 
Plant size >=50 0.3985 0.4897 QWLS 
Part of multi-plant firm 0.4217 0.4939 QWLS 
Foreign firm 0.0945 0.2926 QWLS 
Public sector 0.3535 0.4781 QWLS 
Job disamenities  
Harm 0.2771 0.4476 QWLS 
Hazard  0.3810 0.4857 QWLS 
Uncertainty 0.6018 0.4896 QWLS 
 
Notes: BR = Business Register, FLEED = Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data, KELA = Social 
Insurance Institution and QWLS = Quality of Work Life Survey. Controls also include 14 industry 
indicators (not shown). 
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Appendix Table 2A. The incidence of different HIM variables. 
 
 Mean 
  
Any HIM 0.7742 
  
Specific bundles  
  
PRP only  0.0736 
PRP and training 0.1062 
PRP, training and self-managed teams 0.0083 
All four HIM practices 0.0120 
PRP, self-managed teams and information sharing   0.0043 
PRP and information sharing 0.0286 
PRP, training and information sharing 0.0664 
PRP and self-managed teams  0.0043 
Training only 0.1873 
Training and self-managed teams  0.0244 
Training, self-managed teams and information sharing 0.0249 
Training and information sharing 0.1250 
Self-managed teams only  0.0158 
Self-managed teams and information sharing  0.0128 
Information sharing only 0.0803 
 
Notes: Specific bundles are mutually exclusive components of ‘any HIM’. The sum of the incidence of 
specific bundles constitutes the incidence of ‘any HIM’.  
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Appendix Table 3A. The association between different HIM variables. 
 
Any HIM b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 b10 b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 
Any HIM 
1                
b1 0.1522*** 1               
b2 0.1862*** -0.0972*** 1              
b3 0.0494*** -0.0258 -0.0315* 1             
b4 0.0596*** -0.0311* -0.0381** -0.0101 1            
b5 0.0354** -0.0185 -0.0226 -0.0060 -0.0072 1           
b6 0.0927*** -0.0484*** -0.0592*** -0.0157 -0.0190 -0.0113 1          
b7 0.1440*** -0.0751*** -0.0919*** -0.0244 -0.0294* -0.0175 -0.0458*** 1         
b8 0.0354** -0.0185 -0.0226 -0.0660 -0.0072 -0.0043 -0.0113 -0.0175 1        
b9 0.2593*** -0.1353*** 0.1655*** -0.0439*** -0.0530*** -0.0315* -0.0824*** -0.1280*** -0.0315* 1       
b10 0.0853*** -0.0445*** -0.0545*** -0.0144 -0.0174 -0.0104 -0.0271* -0.0421*** -0.0104 -0.0758*** 1      
b11 0.0863*** -0.0450*** -0.0551*** -0.0146 -0.0176 -0.0105 -0.0274* -0.0426*** -0.0105 -0.0767*** -0.0252 1     
b12 0.2041*** -0.1065*** -0.1303*** -0.0346** -0.0417*** -0.0248 -0.0649*** -0.1008** -0.0248 -0.1814*** -0.0597*** -0.0604*** 1    
b13 0.0684*** -0.0357* -0.0437*** -0.0116 -0.0140 -0.0083 -0.0217 -0.0338** -0.0083 -0.0608*** -0.0200 -0.0202 -0.0479*** 1   
b14 0.0616*** -0.0321* -0.0393** -0.0104 -0.0126 -0.0075 -0.0196 -0.0304* -0.0075 -0.0548*** -0.0180 -0.0182 -0.0431*** -0.0144 1  
b15 0.1596*** -0.0833*** -0.1019*** -0.0270* -0.0326** -0.0194 -0.0507*** -0.0788*** -0.0194 -0.1418*** -0.0467*** -0.0472*** -0.1116*** -0.0374** -0.0337** 1 
 
Notes: Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficients reported. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Key to specific bundles 
b1 PRP only  
b2 PRP and training 
b3 PRP, training and self-managed teams 
b4 All four HIM practices 
b5 PRP, self-managed teams and information sharing   
b6 PRP and information sharing 
b7 PRP, training and information sharing 
b8 PRP and self-managed teams  
b9 Training only 
b10 Training and self-managed teams  
b11 Training, self-managed teams and information sharing 
b12 Training and information sharing 
b13 Self-managed teams only  
b14 Self-managed teams and information sharing  
b15 Information sharing only 
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Appendix Table 4A. The full estimation results.  
 
 
Total number of absence spells, zero infl. negative 
binomial regression  
 
HIM practices 
  
Any HIM v none 0.1483** 
 (0.0668) 
Sickness absence history 
 
The total number of sickness absence days 0.0042*** 
 (0.0007) 
Work history   
  
N of job switches 0.0601*** 
 (0.0220) 
N of employment months -0.0003 
 (0.0013) 
N of unemployment months  -0.0028 
 (-0.0024) 
Ever worked in the manufacturing sector -0.1254 
 (0.0878) 
Ever worked in a firm with over 300 workers 0.0582 
 (0.0710) 
N of layoff episodes -0.0034 
 (0.0322) 
Past average earnings -0.0032 
 (0.0340) 
Past average earnings change 0.1212** 
 (0.0542) 
Worked over 10 years with the current employer 0.0406 
 (0.0831) 
Had over 3 professions over working life 0.1565** 
 (0.0774) 
Controls  
  
Individual  
  
Female 0.4034*** 
 (0.0690) 
Age <=34 0.1744* 
 (0.0892) 
Age 45-54 -0.3489*** 
 (0.0814) 
Age 55-64 -0.5841*** 
 (0.1100) 
Married 0.0657 
 (0.0667) 
Sedondary education 0.0189 
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 (0.0902) 
Polytechnic education -0.2580** 
 (0.1013) 
University education -0.3180** 
 (0.1336) 
Union member -0.0616 
 (0.0741) 
Usual weekly hours 0.0081* 
 (0.0045) 
Employer  
  
Plant size 10-49 0.2392*** 
 (0.0787) 
Plant size >=50 0.3821*** 
 (0.0863) 
Part of multi-plant firm -0.0390 
 (0.0830) 
Foreign firm 0.0832 
 (0.1002) 
Public sector 0.1248 
 (0.1075) 
Job disamenities  
  
Harm 0.3545*** 
 (0.0683) 
Hazard  0.3003*** 
 (0.0635) 
Uncertainty 0.2518*** 
 (0.0598) 
 
Notes: The table reports the estimates for all the included explanatory variables (excluding 
the indicators for 14 industries) from the specification of Column 5 of Panel B in Table 1. 
Average marginal effects and robust standard errors reported. Statistical significance: *** 
p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. N = 3755.  
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Appendix Table 5A. Innovative workplace practices as determinant of replacement policies 
and perceived work intensity. 
 
 ‘Time pressure 
increases sickness 
absence’ 
‘Replacements  
not hired’  
Probit   
   
PRP only  0.0563** 0.0854*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0325) 
PRP and training 0.0403* 0.0860*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0286) 
PRP. training and self-managed teams 0.0417 0.0060 
 (0.0566) (0.0746) 
All four HIM practices -0.0561 0.0279 
  (0.0571) (0.0694) 
PRP. self-managed teams and information sharing   0.1078 0.1557 
 (0.0747) (0.1318) 
PRP and information sharing -0.0744* -0.0050 
 (0.0404) (0.0440) 
PRP. training and information sharing -0.0605** 0.0608* 
 (0.0286) (0.0346) 
PRP and self-managed teams  0.1628** 0.0537 
 (0.0660) (0.0986) 
Training only 0.0304* 0.0677*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0230) 
Training and self-managed teams  0.0138 0.0597 
 (0.0354) (0.0479) 
Training. self-managed teams and information sharing -0.0349 0.0199 
 (0.0411) (0.0477) 
Training and information sharing -0.0537** 0.0178 
 (0.0218) (0.0262) 
Self-managed teams only  -0.0245 0.0719 
 (0.0452) (0.0598) 
Self-managed teams and information sharing  -0.0613 -0.0117 
 (0.0611) (0.0627) 
Information sharing only -0.0429* -0.0035 
 (0.0250) (0.0290) 
 
Notes: Controls as per Column 4 of Table 2 consist of the individual and employer characteristics and industry 
indicators along with work and sickness absence histories. The reference category is no HIM. Average marginal 
effects and robust standard errors reported. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. N = 3584. 
 
